

The Role of Fronting Agents' Trust and Loyalty in Mediating the Effects of Incentive Systems, Organizational Support, Competence, and Job Satisfaction on Retirement Loan Sales Performance

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Keywords:	Abstract
incentive system; organizational support; competence; agent trust; agent loyalty; sales performance	Retirement loan distribution relies heavily on fronting agents whose attitudes and organizational relationships may shape sales outcomes. However, positive perceptions of organizational practices do not necessarily translate into objective sales performance. This study aimed to examine the effects of incentive systems, organizational support, competence, and job satisfaction on sales performance through agent trust and loyalty at the Jasa Jadimulya Berkah Sejahtera Cooperative. A quantitative causal-correlational approach was employed using a saturated sample of 87 fronting agents and a five-point Likert-scale questionnaire. Perceptual relationships were analyzed using PLS-SEM, while objective sales performance was examined separately using appropriate statistical models. The results showed that job satisfaction significantly influenced agent trust ($\beta = 0.775$), while incentive systems, organizational support, and competence had no significant partial effects. Agent trust strongly influenced loyalty ($\beta = 0.901$), whereas loyalty did not significantly affect objective sales performance. Consequently, all chained mediation hypotheses involving trust and loyalty toward sales performance were rejected. Contextual findings revealed substantial inequality in sales opportunities, with a Gini coefficient of 0.806 and 71.3% of sales concentrated in five offices. The study concludes that job satisfaction and trust are crucial for building agent loyalty, but loyalty alone is insufficient to improve sales performance without adequate market opportunities and operational support.

INTRODUCTION

The Jasa Jadimulya Berkah Sejahtera Cooperative (JBS) is a cooperative-based financial institution that focuses on financing services, especially credit for retirees. The goal is to provide optimal and sustainable financial solutions for its members (Aggarwal et al., 2020). Based on the company's profile, Kopjas JBS is the result of a transformation of PT Jadimulya Berkah Sejahtera which was established in August 2023 (Baihaqi, 2025). This company will become the Jadimulya Berkah Sejahtera Cooperative (Aristana et al., 2020) on July 23, 2024. Kopjas JBS has obtained

formal legality from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia with Number AHU-0004696. AH.01.39.YEAR 2025 (Christensen et al., 2021).

Since its transformation, the JBS Service (Aqna & Arifin, 2021) Cooperative has experienced stable development. This can be seen from the improvement of service quality, professionalism of human resources, and the use of integrated information technology that increases operational effectiveness. This cooperative has complete legality and a clear organizational structure (Eisenberger et al., 1986), ranging from supervisors, administrators, to operational managers. This situation shows structured and accountable organizational governance. In its operations, JBS relies on an extensive network of agency (L. Ardini, 2022; R. Ardini & Fadli, 2019) services in various regions of Indonesia, thereby strengthening the penetration of the retirement credit market nationally.

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The characteristics of the business that are based on network, relationships, and trust make the success of the JBS Service Cooperative in achieving sales (Edward, 2017) targets highly dependent on the effectiveness of fronting agent management. Fronting agents become strategic partners for organizations. This condition is in line with the cooperative's vision to become a superior, reliable, and sustainable institution. The cooperative's mission emphasizes transparency, improving human resource competence, and building trust and loyalty of members. Therefore, the JBS Cooperative is a relevant research object (Dwivedi et al., 2021). This study will examine the role of trust and loyalty of agents in mediating the influence (Apriliana et al., 2021) of organizational factors (Asyhari & Yuwalliatin, 2020) on the performance of retiree credit sales. The complexity of the relationship between these variables is important in the cooperative-based financial services industry.

This research is important because the success of the sale of retired loans is influenced not only by products and marketing strategies (Al-Suraihi et al., 2021), but also by internal

organizational factors and fronting agent behavior, such as a fair incentive system, organizational support, competence, and job satisfaction (Davidescu et al., 2020). All of these factors play a role in forming the trust and loyalty of fronting agents and have an impact on sales performance. Kopjas JBS was chosen as the research object because of its relevance to research variables and the dynamics of competition in the retirement financing industry which demands effective and sustainable human resource management.

METHOD

This study used a quantitative approach with a causal correlational survey method, which aims to measure the relationship and influence between independent variables (incentive system, organizational support, competence, and job satisfaction) on agent sales performance, with trust and loyalty as mediating variables. The research population was all fronting agents for the sale of pension loans at the Jadimulya Berkah Sejahtera Cooperative for the period of July 2025-June 2026 which amounted to 87 people, consisting of 42 productive agents and 45 dormant (unproductive) agents. Because the population is relatively small (less than 100), this study uses a saturated sampling technique (census) so that all 87 agents are used as respondents without a random selection process, with the aim of increasing representativeness and reducing the risk of bias. Dormant agents are still involved because these unproductive conditions are at the heart of the phenomenon being studied, so their removal from the sample will actually eliminate an important part of the research problem. With $n = 87$, this study is considered to have sufficient statistical strength to detect a path coefficient of ≥ 0.29 at a power level of 80%, and meets the minimum requirements for PLS-SEM analysis based on the "10 times" rule and the inverse square root method. The data collection was carried out through a structured questionnaire with a 5-point Likert scale (from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree"), which allowed the measurement of respondents' perceptions statistically to test the research hypothesis.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Research Results

Model testing is carried out in two stages, namely the evaluation of the measurement model (outer model) to ensure the validity and reliability of the instrument, and the evaluation of the structural model (inner model) to assess the relationship between constructs. The structural models tested in the PLS-SEM framework were the perceptual chain of Incentive System (Fakhri et al., 2020), Organizational Support, Competence, and Job Satisfaction (Firohmatillah et al., 2020) to Agent Trust, then Agent Trust to Agent Loyalty. The Sales Performance (Y) which is objective and scaled ratio is not included as a PLS-SEM construct, but is analyzed separately in Subchapter 4.2.4. All tests followed the criteria in Chapter III (Hair et al., 2021) using the PLS-SEM algorithm with a path weighting scheme through bootstrapping on 2,000 subsamples from 86 valid respondents.

Evaluation of Measurement Models (Outer Model)

The evaluation of the outer model includes tests of convergent validity, discriminant validity, reliability, and general method bias. The six perceptual constructs (Incentive System, Organizational Support, Competence, Job Satisfaction, Agent Trust, and Agent Loyalty) were treated as reflective constructs measured through a Likert scale questionnaire.

Total Effect Analysis

Given the high collinearity between antecedents that causes the partial path coefficient to be unstable, the analysis is complemented by total influence (Fauzana & Madiawati, 2020) testing in the perceptual framework (Gagné et al., 2022).

Table 1 Total Effect Test Results

Pathway	Total β	OR	t-stat	p-value	Ket.
Agent Trust $\rightarrow$ Incentive System	0,295	0,262	1,126	0,130	No sig.
Organizational Support $\rightarrow$ Agent Trust	-0,001	0,281	-0,002	0,501	No sig.
Agent Competence $\rightarrow$ Trust	-0,133	0,241	-0,550	0,709	No sig.
Job Satisfaction $\rightarrow$ Agent Trust	0,775	0,256	3,034	0,001	Significant
Agent Trust $\rightarrow$ Agent Loyalty	0,901	0,044	20,579	0,000	Significant
Agent Loyalty $\rightarrow$ Incentive System	0,266	0,235	1,133	0,129	No sig.
Agent Organizational $\rightarrow$ Loyalty Support	-0,000	0,254	-0,002	0,501	No sig.
Agent Competence $\rightarrow$ Loyalty	-0,119	0,217	-0,550	0,709	No sig.
Job Satisfaction $\rightarrow$ Agent Loyalty	0,699	0,232	3,005	0,001	Significant

Source: PLS-SEM processing results – Bootstrapping (2026)

Table 1 shows that the total effect of Job Satisfaction on Trust ($\beta = 0.775$) and Trust on Loyalty ($\beta = 0.901$) remains significant and strong. Interestingly, the effect of total Job Satisfaction on Loyalty was also significant ($\beta = 0.699$; $t = 3.01$) although it did not have a direct pathway, as it worked entirely through trust. This strengthens the role of job satisfaction and trust as the main lever in shaping agent loyalty.

Sensitivity Analysis (Model Endurance Test)

To ensure that the results did not depend on a uniform answer pattern, the model was retested without 40 *straight-lining respondents* ($n = 46$).

Table 2 Comparison of Full Model and Non-Straight-Lining Model Results

Hip.	b (n=86)	Results (86)	b (n=46)	Results (46)	Conclusion
H1	0,295	Rejected	0,312	Rejected	Consistent
H2	-0,001	Rejected	-0,019	Rejected	Consistent
H3	-0,133	Rejected	-0,139	Rejected	Consistent
H4	0,775	Accepted	0,767	Accepted	Consistent
H5	0,901	Accepted	0,876	Accepted	Consistent

Source: PLS-SEM processing results (2026)

Table 2 shows that all direct influence hypothesis decisions remained identical when respondents with uniform answer patterns were excluded: H4 and H5 remained accepted, while H1, H2, and H3 remained rejected. The R^2 value at $n = 46$ remained high for Trust (0.790) and Loyalty (0.768), and the Loyalty–Performance correlation remained insignificant. Thus, the research findings are proven to be robust and do not depend on the existence of straight-lining respondents.

Differentiating Analysis Based on Agency Type and Tenure

As a complementary analysis that is exploratory in nature, objective sales performance is compared based on agency type and tenure using nonparametric statistics.

Table 3 Sales Performance by Agency Type

Type	n	Dormant	Rata2 Y.1	Score M2
Permanent Agent	65	36 (55,4%)	2,72	4,75
Contract Agent/PKWT	21	8 (38,1%)	3,67	4,52

Source: Processed data (2026). Mann-Whitney $p = 0.179$; Chi-square $p = 0.260$.

Table 3 shows that contract agents/PKWT actually have a lower proportion of dormant (38.1%) and higher average production (3.67 accounts) than permanent agents (55.4% dormant; 2.72 accounts), even though the loyalty scores of the two are almost the same. However, this difference is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney $p = 0.179$), so it is only a preliminary indication. The limited number of contract agents ($n = 21$) makes the statistical (Cohen, 1988) power of the test low.

Table 4 Sales Performance by Tenure

Tenure	n	Dormant	Rata2 Y.1	M2 Score
< 1 year	36	17 (47,2%)	2,11	4,66
1 – 2 years	24	10 (41,7%)	4,71	4,69
> 2 years	26	17 (65,4%)	2,50	4,75

Source: Processed data (2026). Kruskal-Wallis $p = 0.362$ (insignificant).

Table 4 shows that dormancy cannot be explained by the working period, as agents with a working period of more than two years have the highest dormant proportion (65.4%), while new agents (< 1 year) have a dormant proportion of 47.2%. The difference between these groups of service periods was also not statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis $p = 0.362$). These findings dispel the suspicion that the high dormant rate is solely due to the large number of new agents who have not had time to produce.

Contextual Factor Analysis Outside the Model

Since the chain of attitudes does not convert into objective sales performance, the analysis is continued on contextual factors that are outside the research model. This analysis is exploratory in nature and is intended to identify the structural conditions that limit the agent's opportunity to produce, as the basis for the discussion in Subchapter 4. The two aspects examined are the geographical distribution of the operational area and the development of sales realization over time.

Table 5 Geographical Distribution and Concentration of Sales Realization

Indicator	Value	Interpretation
Number of service offices	45 offices	Range from Medan to Atambua and Sumba
Average agents per office	1.91 agents	The range of control is very thin in each region
Offices with a single agent	22 offices (48.9%)	Almost half of the territory is served by only one agent
Office without realization	19 of 45 offices	Some regions don't generate accounts at all
Concentration of the top 5 offices	71,3% total account	Production is concentrated in a small area
Inter-agent Gini coefficients	0,806	The inequality of production between genes is very high
Test of differences between island clusters	H = 2.053; p = 0.561	Insignificant; Differences are local, not inter-island

Source: Processed data (2026). Gini ranges from 0 (perfectly even) to 1 (perfectly centralized).

Table 5 shows that 86 agents are spread across 45 service offices, with an average of only 1.91 agents per office, and almost half (22 offices) are served by only 1 agent. The concentration of production is extreme, indicated by the Gini coefficient of 0.806 as well as the fact that the top five offices accounted for 71,3% of the total account, while the 19 offices did not generate any realization at all. Interestingly, the Kruskal-Wallis test between island clusters was not significant ($p = 0.561$), which means that this inequality does not follow an inter-island pattern, but is very local, depending on the specific conditions of each region, such as access to pension payment offices and the intensity of competition in each region.

Table 6 Monthly Sales Realization Developments for the Period January 2025–June 2026

Month	Jumlah Account	Producing Agent	% Producing Agent
Jan 2025	5	3	3,5%
Feb 2025	8	5	5,8%
Mar 2025	3	3	3,5%
Apr 2025	10	5	5,8%
May 2025	11	6	7,0%
Jun 2025	12	5	5,8%
Jul 2025	23	12	14,0%
Aug 2025	16	7	8,1%
Sep 2025	14	6	7,0%
Oct 2025	27	12	14,0%
Nov 2025	22	8	9,3%
As early as 2025	25	12	14,0%
Jan 2026	21	15	17,4%
Feb 2026	23	13	15,1%
Mar 2026	22	13	15,1%
Apr 2026	22	16	18,6%
May 2026	24	18	20,9%
Jun 2026	22	15	17,4%

Source: Data on the processed LOS system (2026). Spearman correlation time to number of accounts: $\rho = 0.743$; $p = 0.0004$.

Table 6 shows a strong and statistically significant growth trend, with the Spearman correlation between time and the number of accounts being 0.743 ($p = 0.0004$). The realization increased from only 5 accounts in January 2025 to around 21–24 accounts per month throughout 2026, while the number of agents producing increased from 3 people to 13–18 people per month. Nonetheless, on average, only 9.7 agents or 11.2% of the total agents are produced in a given month, which indicates that the agency ecosystem is still in the formation stage and has not yet reached an established state.

Discussion of Research Results

This subchapter discusses the results of hypothesis testing by relating them to the theoretical and research foundations of previous studies in Chapter II, according to the flow of the mediation chain.

Influence of Independent Variables on Agent Confidence (H1–H4)

Of the four antecedents, only Job Satisfaction had a significant and strong effect on Agent Confidence (H4; $\beta = 0.775$; $t = 3.034$; $f^2 = 0.585$). This finding is explained through Herzberg's Two-Factor (Festinger, 1954) the fulfilment of motivating and hygiene factors forms a positive affective evaluation that fosters agent's confidence in the integrity and commitment of the JBS Cooperative (Spector, 1985; Mayer et al., 1995). In line with the X4 continuum line which is categorized as Excellent (94.21%), job satisfaction is the most dominant psychological determinant in the formation of trust.

The Incentive System (H1), Organizational Support (H2), and Competency (H3) had no significant effect on the partial pathway testing. These results do not mean that all three are not related to trust; The bivariate correlations were all strong (0.817; 0.850; 0.816). Because the four antecedents are highly correlated (VIF 6.1–12.1), their unique effects are largely absorbed by Job Satisfaction, so in total all four factors remain in favor of Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964), but only partially Job Satisfaction makes a significant unique contribution.

The Effect of Agent Trust on Agent Loyalty (H5)

The H5 hypothesis was accepted with very strong influence and was the most significant pathway in the model ($\beta = 0.901$; $t = 20.579$; $f^2 = 4.308$; $R^2 \text{ Loyalty} = 0.812$). This finding confirms that trust is the main prerequisite as well as the dominant determinant of the formation of agent loyalty, very consistent with Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964; (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) as well as Wijaya et al. (2022), (Curatman et al., 2023), and Setiawan & Ekhsan (2020). The strength of this pathway becomes a major empirical (Fu'ad & Gumilar, 2017) contribution of the study: in the context of retired credit union agency, building agent trust almost completely determines agent loyalty.

The Influence of Agent Loyalty on Sales Performance (H6)

Hypothesis H6 is rejected: Agent loyalty has no significant effect on objective sales performance. This conclusion is consistent across all approaches, namely Spearman correlation ($\rho = 0.067$; $p = 0.541$), Negative Binomial regression (Cameron & Trivedi, 1990) ($b = -0.159$; IRR = 0.853; $p = 0.582$), hurdle model for production opportunity ($p = 0.699$), and gamma regression

for ceiling magnitude ($p = 0.160$). In contrast to the expectations of Performance Theory (Appelbaum et al., 2000), perceptual loyalty does not translate into objective sales output, so there is an *attitude–performance gap*. This separate analysis of Sales Performance sourced from objective LOS data actually strengthens the credibility of the findings, as it is not affected by the general method bias that prevalent when performance is measured perceptually.

These findings demand a more in-depth explanation because intuitively trusting and loyal agents should perform better. The most appropriate explanatory framework is the three-dimensional performance model of (Blumberg & Pringle, 1982) which later evolved into the Ability–Motivation–Opportunity framework (Appelbaum et al., 2000). According to this framework, performance is an interactive function of the capacity to perform (ability), the willingness to perform (motivation), and the opportunity to perform (opportunity). This interactive nature is key: if one dimension is close to zero, performance remains low no matter how high the other two dimensions are. In this study, trust and loyalty represent the dimension of willingness that has been proven to be formed very strongly, while competence represents the dimension of capacity which is also categorized as Very Good. Thus, the non-conversion of attitude into performance leads to the main conjecture, namely the limited dimension of opportunity that is not included in the research model.

The first explanation is related to the age of the organization and the stage of formation of agent attachment. The JBS cooperative has only been established for about two years, so the agency ecosystem is still in the formation phase and the attachment of agents has not been built optimally. Empirical evidence of this condition can be seen in Table 4.39: the realization of significant growth from 5 accounts in January 2025 to 21–24 accounts per month throughout 2026 ($\rho = 0.743$; $p = 0.0004$), with the number of producing agents increasing from 3 to 13–18 people per month. This pattern shows that organizations are climbing the learning curve, where the system of recruitment, training, and mentoring of agents is not yet fully mature. In this phase, the agent's positive attitude is generally formed before the operational capabilities that allow it to be manifested in the transaction.

The second explanation is related to operational obstacles due to the wide range of business areas. Table 4.38 shows that 86 agents were spread across 45 service offices stretching from Medan in North Sumatra to Atambua and Sumba in East Nusa Tenggara, with an average of only 1.91 agents per office and 22 offices served by a single agent. Such deployments demand smooth communication and strong monitoring, while the very thin range of control makes intensive assistance difficult. Agents who work alone in an area do not have peers to share best practices, do not receive social pressure from fellow productive agents, and tend to escape regular monitoring. This condition is consistent with the finding that 19 out of 45 offices do not produce any realization at all.

The third explanation comes from the characteristics of the market and the business flow of retiree credit. The retirement credit market is captive and limited, because prospective debtors are retirees registered with certain paying agencies such as Taspen and Asabri. Therefore, the number of leads in an area is relatively fixed and cannot be magnified only through sales efforts. Access

to payroll offices and pension payers is a key determinant of success, and that access is determined more by institutional relationships than by individual agency loyalty. In addition, this segment has long been dominated by large players such as banks specializing in retirement financing, so most prospects have been credit-tied to other institutions and can only be acquired through credit takeover schemes.

The credit process flow also limits the agent's control over the final result. The fronting agent plays a role in the acquisition and filing stage, while the approval decision, ceiling setting, and disbursement are at the credit verification and analysis stage which is beyond its authority. As a result, high agent efforts are not automatically reflected in the number of accounts approved in the LOS system, as some applications are held or rejected at the analysis stage. Coupled with the long retirement credit cycle, where debtors are tied to repayment or meet takeover requirements, the window of opportunity for agents to realize transactions during the observation period becomes very limited.

The fourth explanation relates to the structure of extreme inequality of production. The Gini coefficient of 0.806 and the concentration of 71.3% realization in the top five offices show that production opportunities are very unequal between regions. Interestingly, this inequality does not follow the inter-island pattern (Kruskal-Wallis $p = 0.561$), so it is not just a problem of Java versus outside Java, but depends on the micro conditions in each region. In the framework of Blumberg and Pringle (1982), it is this unequal distribution of opportunity that causes performance variation to be determined more by where the agent works than by how loyal the agent is.

The fifth explanation concerns the compensation structure and the nature of the job as an agent. Most agents are permanent status with relatively guaranteed income, so loyalty doesn't automatically drive extra sales efforts. This is consistent with Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) regarding weak performance incentives when rewards are not fully attributed to results, and is supported by the indication in Table 4.36 that contract agents who are entirely dependent on commissions actually have a lower dormant proportion. In addition, some agents carry out the role of agency as a side job, so the allocation of time and energy is limited, regardless of the high level of loyalty felt.

Thus, these six explanations lead to one coherent conclusion: loyalty is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for sales performance. The positive attitude of new agents will be converted into achievements if accompanied by adequate opportunities, in the form of available market potential, institutional access to pension payment agencies, operational support and monitoring that reaches all regions, and efficient credit processes. The implications for the JBS Cooperative are direct, namely that efforts to build trust and loyalty need to be complemented by interventions on the opportunity side, because without it, investment in attitude formation will not result in the expected sales growth.

The Role of Chain Mediation of Trust and Loyalty (H7–H10)

Consistent with the insignificance of the Loyalty → Performance end-track, all four chained mediation hypotheses (H7–H10) were rejected, with the entire bootstrap trust interval 95% containing a zero. Referring to the typology of Zhao, Lynch & Chen (2010), this pattern is

classified as a no-effect (non-mediation) in the chain towards objective performance, although the sub models of Job Satisfaction → Trust → Loyalty is formed very strongly. The separation of performance analysis from PLS-SEM actually confirms the location of the chain disconnection, namely at the stage of converting loyalty into objective performance.

Overall, this study answers the research gap in Chapter I by examining the chain mediation model of trust and loyalty in the context of retirement credit distribution cooperatives (Choiriyah & Marna, 2024). Its theoretical contribution is twofold: it strongly confirms the psychological chains of satisfaction → trust → loyalty, while providing a critical finding that these chain of attitudes does not necessarily lead to objective sales performance in a population of agents dominated by dormant conditions.

Additional Analysis Discussion

The results of the common method bias test show indications of method bias in the perceptual construct, so the R^2 amount of Trust and Loyalty needs to be interpreted as the upper boundary. The decision to exclude Sales Performance from PLS-SEM and analyze it separately is a methodological step that strengthens the research, as it avoids mixing ratio-scaled objective data into perception-based reflective models. The comparison of the enumerated regression model in Table 4.30 provides a methodological lesson: the Poisson model that ignores overdispersion results in the erroneous conclusion that loyalty has a significant negative effect on performance, while the correctly specified Negative Binomial model shows that the relationship is inherently insignificant. Sensitivity analysis confirms the reliability of the findings because the entire hypothetical decision does not change without straight-lining respondents, while differential analysis provides an initial indication relevant to Agency Theory regarding the influence of compensation structures on agent productivity.

CONCLUSION

The findings of this study can be summarized as follows. Descriptively, all six perceptual variables fell into the Very Good category, with Incentive System at 95.04%, Competency at 94.88%, Job Satisfaction at 94.21%, Agent Trust at 93.91%, Agent Loyalty at 93.90%, and Organizational Support at 93.84%. However, objectively measured sales performance told a very different story: a total of 254 accounts worth IDR 22,458,096,000 were produced by only 42 productive agents (48.3%), while 45 agents (51.7%) remained dormant, revealing a paradox between highly positive agent perceptions and low realized performance. Regarding the influence of the four independent variables on Agent Trust (H1–H4), only Job Satisfaction had a positive and significant effect ($\beta = 0.775$; $t = 3.15$), so H4 was accepted, while H1 (Incentive System), H2 (Organizational Support), and H3 (Competency) were rejected in the partial path test, largely due to high collinearity among the antecedents even though their bivariate correlations with trust remained strong (0.82–0.85). The model explained 83.2% of the variance in Agent Trust. Agent Trust, in turn, had a strong and highly significant effect on Agent Loyalty ($\beta = 0.901$; $t = 20.58$), confirming H5 as the strongest relationship in the model and explaining 81.2% of the variance in Loyalty. By contrast, Agent Loyalty did not significantly affect Sales Performance (H6). Because

sales performance data were objective counts with over half zero values and significant overdispersion, a Negative Binomial model was selected as the best fit, and it showed no significant effect of Loyalty on Performance ($b = -0.159$; $IRR = 0.853$; $p = 0.582$). This result held consistently across alternative approaches, including Spearman correlation, a hurdle model, and Gamma regression, indicating a clear attitude–performance gap. Consistently, all four chain mediation hypotheses (H7–H10) were rejected through a 2,000-replication bootstrap procedure, with every 95% confidence interval crossing zero, meaning Trust and Loyalty did not meaningfully mediate the effect of the independent variables on Sales Performance. The results proved robust: excluding 40 respondents with uniform response patterns did not change any hypothesis decisions, though a common method bias test suggested that coefficients among perceptual constructs should be interpreted conservatively. Contextual analysis further revealed substantial inequality in sales opportunity: 86 agents were spread across 45 service offices (about 1.91 agents per office), realization inequality reached a Gini coefficient of 0.806, the top five offices accounted for 71.3% of total accounts, and 19 offices produced no realization at all while overall showed significant growth over time ($\rho = 0.743$; $p = 0.0004$), suggesting the agency ecosystem is still developing. These findings help explain why positive agent attitudes have not translated into objective performance, consistent with Blumberg and Pringle's (1982) framework that performance requires opportunity, not just willingness and ability.

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