131
American Journal of Economic and
Management Business
e-ISSN: 2835-5199
Vol. 2 No. 3 March 2023
EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON PERFORMANCE
OF LISTED BANKS
Deborah Osei-Baidoo, Oscar Agyemang Opoku, Henry Okudzeto
University of Cape Coast, Ghana
Email: maamesioseibaidoo@gmail.com,oscar.opoku@stu.ucc.edu,
henry.okudzeto001@stu.ucc.edu.gh
Abstract
Following the recent corporate scandals and turbulences in the Ghanaian financial sector,
a fierce debate on banks and corporate performance nexus has emerged. While literature
on banks-corporate performance subject remain highly contested, evidence within the
Ghanaian contest is sparse. This paucity of literature has motivated this study to examine
the effect of corporate governance practices on commercial banks’ performances within
the Ghanaian contest drawing evidence from the Ghana Stock Exchange market for the
period 2009-2019. Correlational analysis and fixed effect and random effect regression
estimator have been employed as the main estimation techniques. Results show that board
diversity positively influence corporate performance indicators such ROA and EPS. The
study further found that size of the board of directors has negative effects on bank’s
performance. Another very important discovery from this study was that, composition of
board of directors has effects on bank’s performance. Thus, independent board of
directors have positive effects on bank’s performance. Ownership concentration has
negative effects on bank’s performance in that larger ownership was usually associated
with higher risks. As a sequel, policy should aim at enhancing corporate governance
practices while females should be given a fair representation on board committees. The
study again advises that independent directors should be included in the board to achieve
greater firm results. The arrangement of company ownership should be assessed and
controlled. Concentrated ownership structure in specific should be promoted and banks
should strive to increase the size of the Independent Board to improve results.
Keywords: corporate governance; performance; listed banks
This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0
International
INTRODUCTION
Every nation’s socio-economic development is globally dependent on how strong
its financial institutions. A strong financial institution forms a good basis for the growth
of the country’s economy. Financial institutions have been identified as a major role
player in terms of the development and growth of every economy (Anbar & Alper,
American Journal of Economic and Management Business
Vol. 2 No. 4 April 2023
132
2011; Appiah et al., 2015; Sarkar et al., 2018). Profitability and performance of the bank
are determined by their ability to effectively and efficiently carry out their strategic
goals (Atta Mills & Amowine, 2013; Oteng-Abayie et al., 2018)
Banks characterized by effectiveness, strong functioning systems and efficiency
are peremptorily having better grounds to resist negative shocks within the economy
which might obstruct their performance. However, rural banks and community banks,
unlike the commercial bank’s performance are not stable due to their low earnings
capacity (Oteng-Abayie et al., 2018).
For a number of causes, the global financial crisis has changed the capital market
environment (Bagh et al., 2017) . To begin with, it has made obtaining the necessary sum
of funds from the stock market more challenging; even those who are better qualified to
bear firm losses must still meet obligations. It is also true that the banking sector serves
as an economy's bedrock and plays a crucial role in a country's economic creation and
development (Bagh et al., 2017). Textiles, cotton, agriculture, small and medium
enterprises, manufacturing, and construction are only a few of the sectors that banks serve
as an intermediary for. Banks offer start-up capital, tools, and other services to these
diverse organizations, all of which contribute directly to national income, growth, and
development. However, banks' failure to raise new capital from capital markets in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis highlights the continuing need to focus on good
corporate governance as an integral part of bank management and growth (Dzigba, 2015).
Corporate governance has developed into a global phenomenon in the aftermath of
the recent global recession, which has sparked interest in business and higher education,
and which has been exacerbated in part by poor corporate governance in a number of
organizations around the world (Agyemang & Castellini, 2015). The financial
institutions' devastating losses, which nearly brought the financial system to its knees and
caused a significant global downturn, illustrate the importance of corporate governance
(Lang & Jagtiani, 2010). Modern financial sector instabilities in Ghana have sparked
debate about the importance of adhering to corporate governance norms, as well as the
consequences of failing to do so. Financial institutions have lost confidence as an outcome
of the lessons learned from the financial crisis across the globe. Barrios et al., (2021), and
financial institutions are now the most challenging to trust organizations worldwide Ries
et al., (2018), notably in Ghana.
The banking sector in Ghana has recently been rocked by extreme turbulence. The
Bank of Ghana terminated over 340 micro finance institutions, including some banks,
microcredit firms, and savings and loans companies, due to a lack of adherence to sound
liquidity management and corporate governance standards. As a result, customers and the
rest of Ghana's unbanked population are prevented from investing in financial markets
(Trombetta et al., 2017). Corporate governance is a mechanism for managing and
governing a company with the aim of maximizing long-term shareholder value while also
considering other stakeholders' interests, business stability, and accountability
(Agyemang & Castellini, 2015).
Ghana's corporate governance is carried out in conjunction with the Commonwealth
Association of Corporate Governance (CAGG) and through the efforts of certain
stakeholders including the Ghana Institute of Directors. Other initiatives to address the
country's corporate governance issues have also been introduced. Ghana and other
developing countries are gradually welcoming the term of good corporate governance,
realizing its value in promoting long-term growth (Agyemang & Castellini, 2015).;
(Kyereboah‐Coleman, 2007)
Deborah Osei-Baidoo, Oscar Agyemang Opoku, Henry Okudzeto
133
However, a systematic review on the corporate governance-bank success nexus in
Ghana shows three issues to be concerned about. To begin with, it can greatly benefit
banks by inculcating better liquidity management practices and expanding opportunities
for growth and performance optimization. Second, large proportion of empirical studies
in the field have concentrated on the effects of corporate governance on the performance
of small and medium-sized companies (Abor, 2007; Dzigba, 2015), corruption, and the
impact of ownership arrangements on firm assessment (Dzigba, 2015). The current
fluctuations in Ghana's financial sector have sparked a debate on corporate governance
and sound liquidity management in the region, in order to avoid insolvency. Finally, prior
studies favored corporate governance, especially among small and medium-sized
businesses, at the detriment of Musah & Adutwumwaa, 2021) banks, which are supposed
to follow good corporate governance practices. For instance examined the effect of
corporate governance on financial performance of rural banks in Ghana. Similarly, Antwi
and Binfor, 2013; Adusei, 2011; Aboagye and Otieku, 2010; OECD, 2004 confirmed that
good corporate governance contributes greatly on banks performance. The current study
analyzed the effects of corporate governance on the performance of banks listed on the
Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) Market against this backdrop in the literature.
RESEARCH METHODS
The study was conducted in an explanatory manner using a quantitative method.
According to Leedy and Ormond (2005), explanatory research entails asking questions
and tabulating responses to collect information about one or more cohorts of individuals,
likely about their distinctiveness, behaviors, beliefs, or prior experiences. In order to
describe, predict and monitor phenomena, the quantitative approach is used to answer
questions about the relationships of measured variables. The benefit of this approach is
that research issues are very specific, subjectivity are eliminated or decreased in decision-
making and the original set of research goals are adhered to. The study's participants are
all Ghanaian banks. All GSE-listed banks are open to the general public. On the GSE,
there are currently twenty-three banks listed. The GSE was chosen for its ability to
contribute to Ghana's economy. The use of publicly traded companies is attributed to data
availability and reliability, since they are mandated by law to provide financial statements
at the end of the year.
Secondary data sources were used as the primary means of obtaining the
information for this study. For the period 2009 to 2019, data was gathered from the
corporate annual reports and websites of the selected listed banks. The thesis focused on
the years 2009 to 2019, owing to the limited availability of data on the variables. For the
following purposes, this study restricted its review to the use of firm's annual reports and
corporate websites, in line with similar prior studies on corporate governance practices
(Adams & Mehran, 2012).
The following model was used to analyze corporate management and bank
performance relationships;
As 𝐏
𝐢𝐭
= 𝛃
𝐎
+ 𝛃
𝟏
𝐙
𝐢𝐭
+ 𝛃
𝟐
𝐗
𝐢𝐭
+ 𝜺
𝒊𝒕
“Where presents the performance level of individual bank ‘i’ at time ‘t’ is a vector
of unknown parameters and is the error term. Z refers to the corporate governance (board
size, independence, board diversity, etc) and X is a vector of bank characteristics that
affect the performance level of bank.”
American Journal of Economic and Management Business
Vol. 2 No. 4 April 2023
134
“Where presents the performance level of individual bank ‘i’ at time ‘t’ is a vector
of unknown parameters and is the error term. Z refers to the corporate governance (board
size, independence, board diversity, etc) and X is a vector of bank characteristics that
affect the performance level of bank.”
CEO duality is measured as a dummy variable with the values 1 the Chairman of
the board is the same as the CEO. That is one person is assigned both portfolios
Board diversity measures the where or not there are females on the board. It takes
the values 1 if there are females on the board and 0 otherwise.
Board Size (BS) is measured as a continuous variable consisting of the number of
members of the board.
Ownership type measures the firm ownership concentration. It is measured as a
dummy variable with values 1 if the firm has large share holders (highly concentrated)
and 0 otherwise (less shareholders)
The analysis of the data was based on quantitative methods. In the analysis of
quantitative data by descriptive and inferential statistics, the Statistical Package for Social
Sciences (SPSS) version 22 was used. This was achieved by modification and coding of
SPSS variables to simplify the generation of statistics (Obure, 2002). Correlational
analysis, as well as fixed and random effect panel estimations, were used to analyze the
results.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
The findings and discussion for the analysis are presented in this chapter. It starts
with descriptive statistics, then moves on to correlation analysis results, which display the
degree of association between the explanatory variables used in the regression model.
Following that, the results of diagnostic tests as well as the fixed and random effect panel
regression models are addressed.
According to Table 1, Firm age has a mean value of 9.5, meaning that the average
age of companies surveyed is ten and a half years, with the minimum and maximum years
being eight and twenty-seven years. The total number of workers is 42, with the minimum
being 24 and maximum numbers 866. The Board size (BS) is 0,634, which means that
63,4% in the Boards of Directors of corporations are 100% and 0%, respectively, not in
the Board of Directors. The norm 0.483 deviation shows that the sample companies vary
in board size.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of variables
Variable
Observation
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Firm Age
198
9.5
6.136973
8
27
Firm size
198
42
1.44
24
866
BS
198
0.634
0.483
0
1
Bind
198
1.000
0.000
0
1
Ownertype
198
0.310
0.464
0
1
CeoDual
198
1.000
0.000
0
1
“Note: ROA refers to Log of return on asset, BS refers to board size, Bind refers to
board independence, Ownertype refers to ownership type and CeoDual refers CEO
Duality”
The average value of Board independence (Bind), determined by the ratio between
external and external Board membership directors, is 1,00 and implies that at least one-
Deborah Osei-Baidoo, Oscar Agyemang Opoku, Henry Okudzeto
135
third of the total Board membership is a relationship between external and internal
directors. 1 and 0 are respectively the highest and the lowest values.
The report presents a correlation matrix for bank corporate governance activities
and results in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 provides a correlation matrix for a bank's return on
assets (ROA) and corporate governance practices, while Table 5 shows the case for EPS.
As shown in Table 4, there is a direct connection between the ROA of a bank and its
corporate governance. Table 5 indicates a positive connection to corporate governance
practices between a bank's EPS earnings per share. The research examines the causal
effect between corporate governance practices and the performance of a bank, since
correlations do not imply cause.
Diagnostics Tests
These are various preliminary tests that are conducted in order to ensure validity
and reliability. These included normality test, multicollinearity test, autocorrelation
among others.
Test for Normality
The Jarque-Bera (J-B) statistic is important in testing the normality of the residuals.
If the residuals are normally distributed, the J-B statistic would not be significant.
The result is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Normality Test
Variables
Sign.
Board diversity
0.214
Ownership type
0.435
Board size
0.154
Firm Age
0.221
Firm Size
0.192
CEO
0.512
EPS
0.329
ROA
0.761
Looking at the Jarque-Bera statistic of the various variables in Table 2, they all
have p-value greater than 0.05. It was concluded that the model with only the ROA, EPS,
and independent factors (board diversity, ownership type, board size, firm age, and firm
size) had residuals that were normally distributed. Hence, the study accepted the null
hypothesis of normal distribution and concluded that inferences made about coefficient
estimates were good.
Multicollinearity Test
Multicollinearity is a problem that arises if some or all of the explanatory variables
are highly correlated with one another. If multicollinearity is present, the regression
model has difficulty telling which explanatory variables are influencing the dependent
variables (Koop, 2013). The degree of Multicollinearity was measured by estimation
of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and tolerance and presented in Table 3.
American Journal of Economic and Management Business
Vol. 2 No. 4 April 2023
136
Table 3: Multicollinearity Test
Variables
Tolerance
VIF
Board diversity
0.761
1.004
Ownership type
0.343
3.210
Board size
0.116
1.788
Firm Age
0.862
4.227
Firm Size
0.455
5.091
CEO
0.782
1.122
In considering the magnitude of collinearity, when VIF is less than 1.0, then
multicollinearity would be high and serious (Gujarati, 2004). In this case, the tolerance
values were all less than 1.0 while VIFs for all the exogeneous variables were greater than
1.0 hence there was no evidence of serious multicollinearity. Moreover, a correlation
matrix of the transformed series at levels was generated and yielded the results shown in
the Table 4.
Table 4: Correlation Matrix for firm ROA and its correlates
ROA
BD
OT
BS
Firm
Age
Firm
Size
CE
O
ROA
1
Board diversity
0.0101
1
Ownership
type
0.2858**
0.0319
1
Board size
0.4464**
*
0.0832
0.1588**
*
1
Firm Age
0.2137**
*
-0.1423
0.487**
0.3645**
*
1
Firm Size
0.184**
0.121*
*
0.2877**
0.319**
0.0851**
1
CEO
0.561***
0.215*
*
0.0464**
*
0.383**
0.046***
0.083
2
1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
Table 5: Correlation Matrix for firm EPS and its correlates
EPS
BD
OT
BS
Firm Age
Firm Size
CEO
ROA
1
Board
diversity
0.3101**
1
ownership
type
0.2800**
0.239***
1
board size
0.284**
0.310**
0.0851**
1
Firm Age
0.262***
0.311**
0.046***
0.183**
1
Firm Size
0.302***
-0.303**
0.175***
0.140**
0.5757***
1
CEO
0.42
9**
0.20
1**
0.20
1**
0.2
019
0.28
58**
0.0
333
1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
Deborah Osei-Baidoo, Oscar Agyemang Opoku, Henry Okudzeto
137
Autocorrelation test
This test involved establishing if in the classical linear regression model the error
terms,
t
were correlated or uncorrelated, that is the error term at time, t was not correlated
with the error term at time, (t-1) or any other error term in the past. The Durbin-Watson
test was used to examine the presence of autocorrelation. The null hypothesis in Durbin-
Watson test shows that there is no serial correlation. Table presents the result of the test.
Table 6: Autocorrelation test
Variable
d-statistic/sig
ROA
(6, 192), 0.821
EPS
(6, 192), 0.633
According to Table 6, the Durbin-Watson test shows that the d-statistics of 0.821
and 0.633 for ROA and EPS respectively. Since the d-statistics are greater than 0.05, the
study failed to reject the null that there is no serial correlation (at 95% significance level)
and concluded that the errors in different observations were not correlated with each
other. This was also supported by the correlational matrix as shown in Table 4 and 5. The
highest correlation was found between firm age and ownership type which was even less
than 0.5. Therefore, the variables were free from multicollinearity as well as
autocorrelation.
Effect of Bank’s corporate governance and performance
From Table 1, the bank's ownership concentration reduces its ROA and EPS by
24.4 percent and 34.1 percent, respectively, due to its ownership concentration. This
suggests that the concentration of a bank's ownership affects its performance negatively.
Table 7:
Panel results on the Effect of Bank’s corporate governance on banks performance
ROA
EPS
Variables
Fixed effect
Random effect
Fixed effect
Random effect
Board diversity
0.155***
(.006)
0.535***
(.007)
0.251**
(.033)
0.353**
(.035)
ownership type
-0.244***
(0.005)
-1.0917**
(0.002)
-0.341***
(.002)
-.687***
(.007)
board size
-0.312***
(.012)
-0.552***
(.023)
-0.214**
(.032)
-0.336**
(.011)
CEO
-0.274***
-0.1173**
-0.376***
-0.541**
(0.0273)
(0.0250)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Firm Age
0.376***
0.441**
0.443***
0.451**
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.015)
(0.012)
Firm Size
0.1818***
0.2057***
0.175***
0.494***
(0.008)
(0.042)
(0.0161)
(0.0911)
Constant
0.543**
0.589**
0.742***
0.3173**
(0.070)
(0.040)
(0.023)
0.0250
Observations
198
198
R-squared
0.432
0.623
Number of id
Chi2
F- Statistics
p- value
10
43.54
89.88
0.000
10
54.04
189.10
0.000
Hausman test
Prob>chi2 = 0.000
Prob>chi2 = 0.000
Durbin Watson = 2.122 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
American Journal of Economic and Management Business
Vol. 2 No. 4 April 2023
138
Similar studies in others countries such as China, Hong Kong and Turkey have
shown that focused firms are not linked to better operational performance or a higher firm
valuation according to existing literature (Chen et al., 2006; Gunasekarage et al., 2007;
Gursoy & Aydogan, 2002). The negative link between concentrated ownership and firm
performance may be caused by the strong wish of majority shareholders to transfer the
company's control and shareholding to future generations (Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010).
Power clusters (e.g. families) often use the majority holding of large companies to
produce "non-specious profit" in the new developing economies, including "the right to
capital according to one's wishes" (Demsetz,1985). Most major shareholders are in a
position to have key positions to supervise the management and executive structure of
enterprises and may conduct actions in their favour, nevertheless, it may be detrimental
to the interests and results of minority shareholders. As a result, the underlying problem
of potential nepotism is centralized power.
In addition, ROA and EPS are reduced by 31.2 and 21.4 in the case of each board
size increase, because the BS has an inversely effect on company productivity. According
to Pathan and Faff (2013), the bank's size was adversely linked to its output. Liang et al.
(2013) examined the impact of the size, composition and structure of the Board on the
banks’ performance using data from Chinese banks from 2003 to 2010. They found that
the scale and effect of the board on bank performance is substantial and negative, as ROA
and ROE assessed.
Agoraki et al. (2009) found a negative cost-benefits efficiency-measured
relationship between executive and bank output. Banks with smaller directors' boards are
more successful according to their results. The size and output of the board is unrelated
to the Turkish economy (Bektas & Kaymak, 2009). Aygün et al. (2010) and Doan and
Yldz (2013) discuss the effect of the Board Size on bank results for the years 2006-2008
and 2005-2010. The findings show that the size of the board is largely adversely linked
to bank profitability based on data from 12 BIST banks.
The study also examined CEO duality as a variable of corporate governance. The
term "Duality of CEO" means whether the CEO and Chairman of the board of directors
are the same individual or not. The effects on firm performance of CEO duality by 27.4
per cent and 37.6 per cent are adverse according to Table 4. The findings of previous
studies are supported by this study. In their study of 141 large companies (Fortune 500
firms) from 1978 to 1983 Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that firms on their boards had
divided boards more efficient than firms on the duality of the CEO.
Dahya et al. (2016) found, in an analysis of CEO duality for coted firms in UK, that
the stock market performs better if both roles are segregated. The effect of CEO duality
on company performance for 347 Malaysian publicly traded enterprises was investigated
by Haniffa and Hudaib (2016). They state it would lead to better financial results if the
two posts were separated. Chahine and Tohme (2009) have examined the connections
between initial under-pricing and the CEO duality in a study of 127 initial public bids
(IPOs), using a sample from Middle East and North Africa, to conclude that firms that
combine two positions are more likely to have under-pricing. These observations agree
with the position of the Agency that the separation of the board members will allow them
to more efficiently exercise their roles in opportunistic management behaviour
supervision.
It was also found that the age of a business has an impact on the results of ROA and
EPS. A number of studies used the term "firm age" to describe how many years a business
Deborah Osei-Baidoo, Oscar Agyemang Opoku, Henry Okudzeto
139
existed (Boone et al., 2007). They indicated that a company's age is a strong indicator of
prospects for future growth. For example, Claessens et al. (2002) noticed that more liquid
trading, more transparency, more investor exposure and more varied operations were
presented to older and larger firms and led to lower risks of financial distress but fewer
opportunity for development. On the other hand, younger and smaller companies can have
better prospects of growth but become more susceptible to conditions of the sector. Older
firms are unable to respond rapidly to climate change (Borghesi et al., 2007).
Similarly, Lipczinsky and Wilson (2001) noted that new firms are projected to make
less profit than older ones because they are less familiar with their businesses and are
trying to establish their own presence. On the other hand, older companies are
approaching the end of the life cycle. The older companies are more likely to have their
high-crowding era, according to Black et al (2006), whereas younger companies are
expanding more quickly. As a result, younger companies that have a shorter history have
higher potential for growth.
The size of the company has a positive effect on performance as seen in Table 4.
For example, as a business increases in size, its ROA and EPS improve accordingly by
18.2% and 17.5%. The relation between company size and efficiency is uncertain
according to different studies (Nenova, 2003; Durnev & Kim, 2005). Large enterprises
have more chance of generating and collecting funds internally and accessing foreign
capital than smaller businesses, according to Joh (2003). Larger businesses will also
benefit from creating entry barriers that increase their profitability by making economies
of scale. As the size of a company is growing, it is more volatile according to Boone et
al. (2007). This means that the company's inherent instability will become more severe.
Moreover, larger businesses also need more representation by the board. Moreover,
bigger organizations have more complex practices to carry out business plans more
efficiently. Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2008) state that larger businesses are advantageous
for production. This is because large corporations have greater resources and diversified
strategies to collect money. It has also a wide variety of management of information.
Business size has a positive effect on company efficiency, according to Black et al.
(2006b).
Other scientists (e.g., Nenova, 2003; Garen, 1994; Agrawal, 1996) have claimed to
face more inspections and scrutinises of large companies. This might cost control families
the extraction of private income (Nenova, 2003). There is a inversely association between
size and success according to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). They claim that larger
corporations are less effective than smaller companies because they have less leverage
over strategic and organizational operations as the company's size increases.
Due to the concentration of ownership of the Bank, its ROA and EPS are reduced
by 24.4 and 34.1 per cent respectively. This suggests that the concentration of a bank's
ownership affects its performance adversely. Various studies in other countries have
found that companies with focused ownership are not associated with improved
operational performance or a greater company evaluation in accordance with developed
literature (Chen et al. 2006, Gunasekarage et al. 2007; Gursoy & Aydogan 2002). The
negative effect of concentrated ownership on firm performance may be attributed to the
strong desire of the largest shareholders to pass on their power and majority ownership to
future generations (Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010).
In emerging markets, power clusters (e.g., families) usually produce "non-speaking
income," using the majority ownership of major firms, such as "the freedom for capital
to fit one's own wishes" (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Majority shareholders are able to
American Journal of Economic and Management Business
Vol. 2 No. 4 April 2023
140
influence the management and executive structure of enterprises with key positions; such
shareholders are able to perform acts that promote them, but may harm minority
shareholders and the performance of the company. Consequently, a possible nepotism is
the underlying problem of centralized ownership.
Each board size increase unit (one other member) also decreases the bank's ROA
and EPS respectively to 31.2 and 21.4, which means that board size has an adverse effect
on the productivity of the company. The size of a bank board was found to be negative in
terms, by Pathan and Faff (2013). Liang et al. (2013) examined the effect on financial
results and capital adequacy of the banks of the board and found that the BS impacts on
bank performance (ROA and ROE), significantly and negatively. In a study of 58 major
European banks from 2002 to 2004, Panagiotis et al. (2007) found a negative relation
between the size of the Board and profitability.
Banks with smaller director's boards are more efficient according to their results. In
the Turkish market there is no relation between the size of the board and the output of
banks, Kaymak and Bektas (2008) and Bektas and Kaymak (2009). The effect of the
Board size on the Bank's performance is examined for the years 2006-2008 and 2005-
2010 by Aygün et al. (2010) and Doan and Yldz (2013). Their findings show that the size
of the board is significantly negative in relation to bank profitability based on information
from 12 BIST traded banks.
The analysis also examined the CEO duality as a component of corporate
governance. The term "CEO duality" refers to whether the CEO and President of the
Board of Directors is the same person or not. Table 4 indicates that 27.4 percent and 37.6
percent of the CEO duality have a negative effect on bank’s performance. The findings
of previous studies are supported in this study. In its study of 141 large companies
(Fortune 500 companies) from 1978 to 1983 and find that businesses with divided boards
perform better than companies with CEO duality on board. Dahya et al. (2016) discovered
that when the two positions are divided, the stock market works better, according to a
report on CEO duality in coted companies in the UK.
For 347 publicly traded Malaysian firms, Alleyne et al., (2016) studied the effect
of the CEO duality on company performance. They argue that dividing the two places
would lead to better outcomes. Chahine and Tohme (2009) used a sample from the North
and the Middle-East to analyze the connection between the initial price undercutting and
CEO duality in their study of 127 original public offerings (IPOs) companies to find that
firms which integrate various posts in the same person are most likely to face lower prices.
These results support the Agency’s position to allow Board members to perform more
efficiently their roles in controlling opportunistic management activity in separating the
two positions.
The study also found that an age of a business has a positive effect on ROA and
EPS outcomes. A number of studies used the term “firm age” to describe the number of
years a business has existed (Udell, 2019). They noted that a company’s age is a strong
indicator of future prospects for growth. For example, for example, Claessens et al. (2002)
found that older and larger firms have more cash trading, higher transparency, more
coverage by investors and more varied activities that reduce the risk of financial hardship
but lower opportunity for growth. Younger and smaller enterprises, however, are more
vulnerable to market conditions and may have better potential for development. The older
enterprises are unable to react rapidly to climate change (Borghesi et al., 2007).
Lipczinsky and Wilson (2001) found in the same light that young businesses are
likely to make less profit than older companies because they have less market experience
Deborah Osei-Baidoo, Oscar Agyemang Opoku, Henry Okudzeto
141
and attempt to establish a personal presence. In the other hand, older companies are
approaching the end of their cycle of existence. The older companies are more likely to
finish a phase of high growth, according to Black et al. (2006), whereas younger
companies grow more rapidly. Thus, the opportunities for greater growth are stronger for
younger businesses with a shorter history of integration.
As Table 6 shows, corporate size has a positive effect on outcomes. As a business
increases by 18.2% and 17.5% respectively, its ROA and EPS are increased. The
connection between company size and productivity is not obvious, according to numerous
studies (Durnev & Kim, 2005). Larger companies have more chances of generating and
seeking funding internally and gaining access to foreign capital than smaller firms
according to Short and Keasey (1999) and Joh (2003). Larger businesses may also benefit
from erecting barriers to entry that enhance their profitability. The size of a company
becomes more diverse (Boone et al., 2007). This means that the company’s inherent
volatility will be taken into account. It also requires larger corporations to be represented
more by boards.
In addition, larger organizations are linked to more nuanced practices to implement
business strategies more efficiently. Larger sizes of companies are beneficial for
efficiency according to Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2008). This is because large corporations
have greater resources and diversified strategies to collect money. It has a wide variety of
management of knowledge. The firm size has a positive impact on corporate performance,
as stated by Black et al. (2006b).
Other researchers (Nenova, 2003; Garen, 1994; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) say that
big enterprises are being further inspected and monitored. This might cost the controling
families the extraction of private income (Nenova, 2003). The negative correlation
between firm size and performance is recorded by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). They
assert that bigger companies are less productive than smaller companies because they
have less control over strategically and operational activities as the company's size
increases.
CONCLUSION
While the scope of this study is small, it is obvious that: diverse boards influence the
output of banks positively. In that smaller board size added more to the success of the
banks as they were more efficient for controlling management activities. The size of the
management board has a negative impact on bank output.
Membership of the Executive Board has an effect on the success of the bank. The
Independent Committee allows the Board to track managers' self-interested activities and
minimize issues in the agency. In support of management theory, self-directed jobs,
organizations, which are governed by executive boards, may be best used for free
managers from subordination. At least one third of autonomous directorates in boards of
directors, for efficient management and for impartial oversight are preferred to theory of
stewardship and as has been established.
The concentration of ownership has a negative effect on output of the bank. High
concentration of ownership restricts diversification, decreases owners' risk tolerance and
needs to be reduced. In keeping with the stakeholder theory, it is essential that the
members of firms which contribute or control important, skilled inputs (specific corporate
human capital) are raised to the voices and provide ownership incentives and that interest
in these critical stakeholders is aligned with the interest of outside, passive shareholder
parties.
American Journal of Economic and Management Business
Vol. 2 No. 4 April 2023
142
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Copyright holders:
Deborah Osei-Baidoo, Oscar Agyemang Opoku, Henry Okudzeto (2023)
First publication right:
AJEMB American Journal of Economic and Management Business